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ABSTRACT

The Religious Schema on
Critical Thinking Skills

by

Matthew J. Kirby, Educational Specialist
Utah State University, 2008

Major Professor: Dr. Gretchen Gimpel Peacock
Department: Psychology

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between critical
thinking and religious schema as represented hy religious orientation. Past research has
included religious belief within the larger construct of paranormal belief, and
demonstrated a correlation between high levels of paranormal be! ief and poor critical
thinking skills. Studies in the psychology of religion suggested that a more complex
religious measure based on religious orientation was necessary to understand these
correlations. Additionally, schema theory offored a cognitive framework within which to
experimentally test the cause of these correlations. This study found that primed
religious schema did not account for the relationship between paranonnal/religious belief
and critical thinking skills. This study did find that poor critical thinking pcrfonnance
was predicted by higher levels of extrinsic religious orientation.
(58 pages)
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Critical thinking has been ddined as ''reasonahle, reflective thinking tbat is
focnsed on deciding what to believe and do" (Norris & Ennis, 1989, p. 1), and is an
increasingly important skill in the modern world. Educators, researchers, ru1d legislators
have paid much attention to how to increase critical thinking skills in students. Studies
have likewise been conducted to determine how numerous factors, such as age,
education, and creativity, are related to critical thinking ability (see Follman, 2002 for a
review), Because critical thinking helps determine belief: that is, detennine whether an
idea should be treated as if it were true (Gilbert, 1991 ), mru1y researchers have focused
on how holding different beliefs relates to critical thinking ability.
Additionally, the results of several stndies suggest that prior beliefs can impact
critical thinking ability (Evans, Bru'ston, & Pollard, 1983; George, l 995; Greenhoot,
Semb, Colombo, & Schreiber, 2004; Lawson & Weser, 1990; Lawson & Worsnop,
1992). Specifically, researchers have shown that paranormal belief is negatively
correlated with certain critical thinking skills such as inference, induction, and deduction
(Alcock & Otis, 1980: Merla-Ramos, l 999; Morgan & Morgan, 1998; Tobacyk &
Milford, 1982; Wierzbicki, I 985), Paranormal belief has been defined as belief that is
inexplicable given current scientific understanding, or explicable only with major
revisions to current scientific understanding, and is incompatible with normative beliefs
(Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). By this definition, religious belief has been considered by
many to be a paranonnal belief It has been similarly associated with errors in critical
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thinking; however differential findings and corre\ational data are insufficient to draw
conclusions regou·ding causality (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Merla-Ramos; Morgan &
Morgan; Roe, 1999).
Some researcher8 suggest lhai religious belief can be thought of as a religious
schema (Lau. J989; Mclntnsh, l 995) Scl1tm1a1a arc theoretical cognitive representations
of knowledge and mcmu1y that impact cognil ive proces~ing. When activated or primed
by incoming still1ldi, they aifoct subseqlleot processing for tbe duration of their activity
(Narvaez & Bock, 2002). Schema can thereti.1re be te8ted experimentally through
deliberate priming and observation of their effects. Previous research on critical thinking
and belief that did no1 take schema priming into account would be 1imi1ed by procedural
order For example, a religious belief scale giv(m p1ior to a critical thi116-ing task could
inadvertently activate religious schema. An approach lo religious btilief where schema
acfrvation is experimentally controlled for can therefore provide a framework within
which to gain a better understanding of the relationship between religious belief and
critical thinking skills.
The purpose of this study was to determine whether or not an individual's
religious schema can accounl for the observed relationship between religious beliefs and
critical thinking skills. It is hoped that the findings of this study will help to better
unden,iand aspects of both the psychology of religion, and critical thinking. Critical
thinking is a.n essential ~kill, and it is impmiant lo gain a better underntandiog of how
religious schema impact critical thinking pt>rformanc<'.

The following hypotheses and research questions guided this study.
I Is there a difternnce in cntical thinking ability

\¥he11

religious schema are

p1imed? II was bypothi'sized that thoge individuals who have primod religious schema
would have poorer criticlll thinking performance than those individuals who do not have
primed religious schema.
2. What predicts critical thinking p\!tformancc· schema (religious vs. neutral),
intlinsic religious orientatlon, and/or ext1insic religious orientation? 11 was hypothesized
that schema ptiming would be a strongtlr predictor of critical thinking perfonnancc than
intrinsic or extrinsic religious orit.mtation. It was also hvpothe.sized that although
religious orientation would have less predictive value for critical thinking than schema
priming, higher levels of intrinsic orientation would be a stronger predictor of poor
critical thinking skills than extrinsic orientation.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The proposed study draws together thn,e areas of research in cognitive
psvchology and social psychology. Each area is important to understanding the
relationship being invesligated, and so the followinµ review ofliterarnre will addre,s 1he
relevant findings from n·searoh on critical thinking, critical thinking and belief, and
religious belief and religiow, schema

Critical Thinking

Critical thinking has been defined as the use of directed cognitiYe skills lo obtain
the most favorable or dei,ired outcome in a given situation (Halpern, 1998), and as
"reasonable, reflective thinking that is foct1~ed
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deciding what to believe and do,''

(Norris & Ennis, 1989. p. l) ll involves the applied use of knowledge, inference
(deriving conclusions from facts), deductive and inductive reasoning (applying rnles of
logic}, and meta•-cogni1ion (awareness und self-regulation of cognitive processes:
Bruning., Schraw., Norby, & Ronning, '.2004 ). lt utilizt:s higher order cngnitive skills of
judgment, analysis . and synthesis (Halpern). Ii is a skill that is under increasing demand
by employers and educators.
Hunt's (1995) analysis of the Cllrrent workforce and proj,?.clions for the m1l1rre of
!he future workplace revealed a discrepancv between the q11ali11es of the present pool of
employees available for hin~. and the qualities that will be e-..pected by
the foture. The nature

l)f

Rn

employer in

work is shifting from labor-based tasks to cognitive-based
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tasks Employers will increasingly place greater emphasis on higher siducation. and ~eek
individuals possessing cognitive flexibility, with the capacity to handle rnu.ltiple.
complex problems that require abstract reasoning and clitical thinking abilities (Hunt)
Additmnally, the dissemination of information through mass media, made increasingly
possible by rectlnt technologies., pre~ented the average individual v.ith a vast amounl of
information to critically consider (Douglas, 2000). flunt ,:oncludecl that there is a deficit
in average employee critica.l thinking ability, and that unless measures are taken to foster
critical thinking the population will be unprepared to meet fature demand
Legislators have declared a national need to ti;,ach s1udents critical thinking skills
(National Education Goals Panel, l 991, Pitliers. 2000). Sternberg ( 1985) observed that
1here has never been ··a greater push to teach children to think critically" To this end,
researchers have also examined how different factors correlate and in1eract with critical
thinking ability (see Follman. 2002 for a review). R,1search has demonstrated moderateto-high correlations between critical thinking and scholastic achievement. Students v, ith
higher critical thinking ability do be1ter on measures of scholastic success such as UP A,
achievement testing, and college entrance exams (Follman). Educators and researchers
have demonstrakd that students can be taught lo think critically, but that individuals have
tlifltculty generalizing or transferring thinking skills learned in one domain to other
domains (Halpern, ! 998, Kuhn, 1999: Pithers, 2000, Swartz & Perkins. l 990) Given the
importance of critkal thir1king, it becomes essential to underntand those factors that
influence critical thinking.
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Critical Thinking and Belief

Researchers have demonstrated that prior knowledge and bdiels affect masoning
ability (Evans c1 al. l9!U; George, 19'15, Grecnhool et al., 2004, Law8on & Weser,
1990; Lawson & Worsnop, l 9Q2). When presented with a reasoning task r,:quiring a
decision as io whethe1 or not a given conclus1nn is 1enable. indi\iduals t_vpically drfer to
pnor beliefs rather th8n th,i i:viclence provided !0 make the decision. In other words.
individuals tend to maintain those beliefs alreiidy held, even in the foe,· of evidence to the
contra,y.
In a study by Evans and colleagues ( l 9R]) pa1iicipants were given logica.1
arguments and worn asked to rate the argument as either valid or invalid Results
indicated that when an invalid argument's co11clu:,ion v,as believable to 1he ~ubject. they
rated that argument as being valid, whereas the validity of argumeuts with unbelievable
conclusion~ was asses~ed more accuratdy. [ndividuals tended ro employ greater logical
reasoning when they disagreed with the argument's conclusion and less logical reasoning
when the conclusion accorded with their prior beliefa.
Educational researchers have likewise shown that students have greater difficulty
learning new material when that material contiicts 1\ilh prior beliefs (Chambliss, 1994,
Kardash & Schol"s, I C)95) This phrnomenon i, explained by the conc,'pl of'belief
perseverance, or adherence to a belief to an unreasonable degree, as when the belief lacks
evidential support or is shown io be fa.lse by rnntradictillg evidence Such is often the
case with paranormal beliefs in extrasensory perception (ESP) and l.'fOs, or with
religious beliefa in God and life after death, that are espoused without empirical evidence
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or in spite of evidence lo the contrary. Belief perseverance oftbis natrnc can appear, at
least outwardly, a, if the believer lacks critical thinking or reasoning ability. This is
perhaps why researchers have turned their a1tention to the relationship between
paranom1al belief and critical thinking.
Paranormal believers have been shown 10 have deficient critical thinking skills bv
several researchers (Alcock & Otis, 1980; Irwin. 1991; Merla-Ramos, 1999; Morgan &
Morgan., 1998; Toba.cyk & Milford, !982:. Wierzbicki. 1985) Methodology in each of
these studies was relatively consistent (see Table l ). ln each case subjects wern given
scale', lo measurn their paranormal belief; commonly the Paranormal Belief Scale
developed by Tobacyk and Milford ( 1983 ). This measure contains subscales for different
areas ofparanonnal beliet'. including traditional religious beliet: psi (psychic) belief.
witchcraft, supersti1ion, spiritualism, extraordinary life forms. and precognition
Pa1iicipants also completed a task designed to measure some aspect of critical thinking
ability, and the score~ on Paranormal Belief Scale and critical tbinking measure were
then corre\aied. Alcock and Otis, and Morgan and Morgan all used standa.rdized tests of
critical thinking that examined multiple skill are,rn Jrn1in, Merla-Ramos, Tobacyk and
Milford, and Wierzbicki used tests of inference and syllogistic reasonirig, which did not
look at all skill areas involved in critical thinking
Of those six s1udies. Alcock aud Otis (1980), Wierzbicki (1985), and Tobacyk
and Milford (l 982) found significant global correlations such that higher paranom1al
belief scores were associated with poor critical thinking or reasoning skills. Irwin
(l 99] ), Merla.-•Rarnos ( l 999), and Morgan and Morgan (1998) did not find the same

relationship Merla--Rarnos found that poor reasoning abilities emerged only when the

n
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Table l

Studies on Beli,iand C'rilical 1hinking
]Vlemmre

---

Afouck & Ofo;; 0 980j

Critical thinking

Bdief

Study

Bdie!' in Parnpsd.wlogy Seal-:

·~vau,on-Gieii,Cl Cri1icd Thinkinr,
Appraisal., m1d Cornell Critical
Thinkmg ·rest

Panmormnl. BcfoJ Scale, Index

Syllogism Questi.onntiire

Irwin (1991)
Me'Ila--Rm:nos Ci 999)

of .Rehgi.nusncst::., Hnd Agle':
Univers,il Relig,irne:, Orien:tati,1n

Senk
\V:n:,1:,n-Gbr,.,c.:r Ci:it1u,\ Thinkinfl
i\pJ ,rnisal

Morgan & Morgan ( 19':>8)

Tobacyk & Miikrrd ( 11,82)
Wicr;rbicki

O~)85)

[rratiomd Belief Scak

Uncn1.ical J11foren,;;e T0:~t

Paranormal Behd Scale

critical thinking item (logical syUogisms for this study) contained content relevant to
paranormal or religious belief Morgan and ~forgan found correlatio1rn Ollly on c,:r"tain

dimensions of belief and critkal thinkinu, but hitth scores on the relie:im.is be.lief ~.c:ale
r._.,,',

..,,,

~)

were correlated with poor performance on evaluation of arguments. Irwin found only

high levels of uaditfonaI rel.igious belief to be correlated with poor reasoning ability,

n i.s important to nott~ tha1

e.-....pcrimental procedures differi~d for both Mer\a. .

Ramos (1999) and J\forgan and Morgan (1.998). .In those studies that found global

correlations (Alcock & Otis, 1980; Tobacy & Mil.fbrd, 1982; Wierzbicki, 1985) the rating
scales of paranormal belief were given irnmediatelyprior to the critical thinking iten11;.

In Meda-Ramos'' study, there was a delay of several days between the rating of
paranornud belief and the administration of the critical thinking items. 1\.1organ and
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Morgan gave the paranormal belief scale ,!frerthe critical thinking items. These
differences in procedure are important and their potential implications will be addres,ed
la1er in this review. Irwin's study did not fit with this pattern, having administered the
Paranormal Belief Scale prior to the reasoning task, but failing lo find a relationship
between global pa.ranormal belief and reasoning ability. While Irwin, Merla-Ramos, and
Morgan and Morgan did nol find global correlations, they did identify significanl
correlations 011 narrower variables and subscales Ofpartkular interest io thig review are
the findings on religious belief as wrrtained within the larger context of paranmmal
belief
The inclusion of rdigious belief within a larger paranormal behef scale has been a
source of debate. The traditional religious beliefsubscale on tht: Paranormal Belief Scale
(Tobacyk & Milford., 1983) comprises four items on life after death, and the existence of
<7od . the devil, heaven, and hell. Some contend that religious belief and paranormal
belief share similar key foa1 ures. R,:,searchers argue that both religious and paranonnal
beliefs am held in the absence of empirical evidence, and therefore share spa~· at one
end of a continuum where beliefs held because or scientific or empirical evidence occupy
the opposite role (Tobacyk & Milford). Others point to research 6ndings related to
religious belief and paranormal belief to argue for a distinction ( Merla-•Ramos, 1999 ).

Irwin's ( l 99 I) study found that paranormal believers did 1101 do more poorly on a tesl of
syllogistic reasoning. However, those individuals endorsing high levels of religious
belief did significantly more poorly. Irv.in suggested that the differential performance of
religious believers and paranormal believers indicates thaJ the two beliefs are separate
phenomena, and that they should be treated as such in research.

]()

Williams, Taylor, and Hintze (l989) argued that rcligjon and religious beliefs are
multidimen8ional, a11d therefore cannot be understc>od as a unitary construct measured by
a single subscale on the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983)

!'hey

conducted a coffelational study comparing Tobacyk and Milford's paranormal belief
scale (including the original religious belief dimension as well as added dimen~ions of
beliet'in science and astrology), with Allport and Ross' ( ! 967) Religious Orientation
Scale, a more complex measun: of religious orientation. Their findings suggested that
when religious belief is broken into extrinsic, intrinsic, indiscriminate, and nonreligious
orientations, a much more dynamic relationship with paranormal belief emerges.
Results from the Williams and colleagues' ( l 989) study showed that this religious
orientation was highly related to beliefin religion, science, and the paranormal.
Intrinsically oriented individuals, those who have internalized their beliefs and attempt to
follow them completely, are significantly lower than all other group9 in belief in sc.ience,
superstition, extraordinary lire fonns and astrology, but high in belief in religion,
witchcraft, and precognition. On the paranormal belief scflle, the items referencing
witchcrat\ deal with the existence of black magic and witches. As Williams and
colleagueg explai11ed, these have a place in the Judeo .. Chtistian tradition a, powers
antithetical to God, so belief in their exiHtence is no, unexpected among religious
intrinsics. Extrinsically oriented individuals, those Ji::,r whom religion serves an external
fum:tion and lacks internaliwtion, reported inverse le,els of belief on these same factors
(low belief in religion, witchcraft, and precognition. and high belief in i,cience,
extraordinary life-forms, superstition and astrology). Given these findings it is important

that any research attempting to underntand religion mus1 do so with consideration of i1s
multidimensional nature.
Of those studi,1s dealing with paranormal belief and critical thinking. only MerlaRamos ( 1999) treated religious belief with the complexity suggested by Williams and
colleagues (1989). Morgan and Morgan (1998) found that traditional religious belief
correlated negatively with the ability to evaluate arguments, hut used only 1he religious
belief dimension of the Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983) In e<Jntrast,
Merla-Ramos' ( 1999) study compared performan,;e on logical syllogisms with a
paranormal belief scale but also utiliz,:d the Index of Religiousncs8 (Zuckerman, Kasi &
Ostfeld, 1984) and the Age Cniversal Religious Orientation Scale (Gorsuch &
McPherson, l 989). In line with re~eard1 mi the effects of prior belief's on critical
thinking (Evans et aL 1983), subjects perfom1ed more poorly on items with ooniont
relevant to their reported beliefs Subjects who rated themselves highly on religious
belief scales performed more poorly than nonbelievers when the item contained con1cnt
relevant to rdigious belie( indicating that individuals with religious beliefs are
difforent,ally critical of information as it relates to prior belief
Although previous research has demonstrated a correlational 1elationsliip between
religious belief and poor critical thinking abilit:v, none of the n,search conducled in this
a.rea has demonstrated a causal re.lationsbip Additionally, some rnsea1chers have failed
lo n~plicate previous findings, indicating that the relationship being examined is still not
well understood. Rorc (] 999) found no diffen:nce between lhe abilities of paranormal

believers and nonbelievers to critically evaluate the competence of exp\lri1rn,ntal studies,
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and Hergovich and Arendasy (2005) found no difference when comparing paranormal
believers tn nonbelievers on two !ests of critical thinking.

Future research should attempt 10 isol::1te and experimentally address the
relationship between cntkal thinking and religious belief takmg into ~ccom1t the
multidimensional nature of religious orientation Cognitive schemata offer a potential
means by which this relationship can be examined.
Religious Belief and Religious Schema

ResearcherH ha Ye suggested Ihat religion and religious belief can be
conceptualized as a cognitive schema (I .a11, I')89, McIntosh, i 995). Schemata art
struclures of knowledge and memory They arc conceptual r,·presentations of an
individual's accurnulakd experience (Bruning et nl, 2004) ln other words. on~ could
have a schema for a hird, called a memory object or concept, a schema for a zoo
environment, called a cognitive field, or a schema for tht: actual experience of enjoyinit
that same zoo, known as a script. The largest schrmata, called mental models, contain
and affect rnm1ernus smaJ!er schemHla wiH1in them (Dutk1:, 1996, Johnson-Laird . 1983)

Each schema consists of slots and corresponding values ti..ir each slot A bird
schema might include slots for physiciil foaturns and sile, among others The slol for
physical foatures would include values for what am typical clwracteristics of birds, such
as feathers and wings. Tims, whl"n we i:ncounter a bird, ,ve recognize il as such because
it matches acceptably with our schema for bird (Anderson, 2000)

Our perception ig filtered througli our schemata as we attempt to underntand wh,1t
it is that we experience. Our schemata can actually shape our perception and our
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memory in order to force something to fit within our framework, functioning as
"interpreters of stimuli''' (Narvaez & Bock, 2002, p. 298), and thereby become the basis
of our memory by affecting how information from our environment is processed,
interpreted, organized, stored, and retrieved (Rumelhart, 1981; Rumelhart & Ortony,
1977), with interpreting comprising perhaps the strongest role. Schemas are hierarchical
in organization (Anderson, 2000; Derry, l 996), and fhc largest of these, mental models,
have tremendous influence over subordinate schemas and affect how we function and
interact with our environment on a more global scale.
McIntosh (1995) has suggested that religion and religious belief function in the
same way as a large schema, or mental model, providing an extensive framework by
which experiences are interpreted, More specifically, McIntosh ( 1995) suggested that a
religions sehema construct can be represented by an intrinsic religious orientation as
delineated by Allport and Ross (1967). Donahue (I 985) referred to intrinsic
religiousness as "a meaning endowing framework in terms of which all of life is
understood" (p. 400), functions that McIntosh sees as evidence for having a developed
religious schema.
Researchers have conducted studies supporting the existence of religious
schemata. In a study on values (Lau, 1989) religious believers and nonbelievers rated the
importance of schema-relevant values (e.g,, being moral and nonegoistie ), and values that
were not schema-relevant (e.g., academic achievement). Individuals classified as
religious believers endorsed values relevant to religious schema significantly more highly
than nonbelievers. Moreover, the difierences on schema-relevant values disappeared
when statistically controlling for religious belief Spencer and McIntosh (l 990) found
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that individuals with religious schema had significantly faster response times than
individuals without religious schema when asked whether a religious adjective described
them.
Further evidence validating both the presence of cognitive religious
representations and the intrinsic/extrinsic framework has emerged from research using
the Implicit Associations Test (!AT) methodology. In the IAT methodology, participants
are presented with simple stimuli, such as words on a computer screen, and a.re asked to
classify it into one of two categories as quickly as possible (Fazio & Olsen, 2003). By
this method, researchers are able to access what are implicit, rather than explicit
associations. Wenger and Yarbrough (2005) compared explicit identification with
religious orientation on a rating scale to implicit identification with religious orientation
in an IAT study and found consistency between the two. The orientation endorsed by
participants on the religious orientation scale matched the orientation revealed in their
implicit identification, indicating that an intrinsic/extrinsic orientation is a construct
internal to the individual. Therefore, when an individual completes the Age Universal
Religious Orientation Scale, their responses can be viewed as evidence for a true
religious motivation, and not as a manifestation of another process, such as the social
desirability or expectation of a particular response. These three studies (Lau, 1989;
Spencer & McIntosh, 1990; Wenger & Yarbrough) imply that a cognitive representation
exists within religious believers that affects the way they process stimuli.
Critics point out that McIntosh (1995) is using schemata too broadly (Paloutzian,

& Smith, 1995). ln particular they indicate that unlike McIntosh's "always on"'
conceptualization, schemata are activated and deactivated according to need and
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environmental encounters. Thus. the religion schema would be activated only if the
individual were presented with enough relevant stimuli. In light of spreading activation
theory, this is not necessarily the case. There is substantial evidence that memory
structures are organized in a propositional network of related concepts (Anderson, 2000).
According to this cognitive model of spreading activation. schemata that are semantically
related will activate or prime one another when either or the other becomes activated.
The bird from the previous example might prime the schema for worm, as the two are
oflen linked together (as in "The early bird gets the wom1"). This secondary activation is
not directional. and so highly interconnected schemata are more likely to become

activated as they can be triggered by numerous semantic links (Anderson). A large
schema, such as one for religion, would be highly connected, and therefore easily primed.
So it may not be that the religious schema is "always on," but more accurately, the
religious schema is frequently primed.
Randolf:Seng and Nielsen (2007) used primed religious representations to test
honesty. Participants in this study unscrambled sentences that contained religious,
sports-related, or neutral words. They were then given an unrelated task with the
opportunity and incentive to cheat on that task. Results showed that participants with
primed religious representations, whether of intrinsic orientation or not, cheated less than
those without primed religious representations. These results support the hypothesis that
the priming or activation of religious schema can influence behavior. These results show
that religious schema offer a method for experimentally treating the effects ofreligious
belief

16
These findings are also salient to the differing procedures implemented by
researchers of c.riticaI thinking and paranormal belief. Those studies in which the
participants were given the paranormal belief scale immediately prior to the criticalthinking task showed the largest correlations between paranormal belief and poor critical
thinking. The remaining two studies either had a significant amount of time between the
administration of the belief scale and critical-thinking items, allowing for deactivation of
schemata, or reversed the presentation of the scales mitigating the effects of priming.
Thus, it is possible that the differing outcomes can be attributed to the activation or lack
of activation of relevant schemata brought on by procedural variability. Future research
should attempt to control for this possibility, however, schema activation is not the only
process offering an approach to understanding previous findings.
Another possible explanation for the poorer critical thinking performance among
paranormal and religious believers is the concept of stereotype threat first introduced by
Steele aud Aronson (1995). Stereotype threat can occur when an individual from a
particular social group faces a task about which there exist stereotypes relevant to the
performance of members of the social group to which they belong. Steele and Aronson
looked at the intellectual performance of African Americans, and found that when
African American students were aware of the diagnostic nature of an intellectual task,
they performance more poorly. The authors concluded that the negative stereotypes
about African Americans' cognitive or academic abilities threatened the participants and
adversely affected their performance. Subsequent studies have identified the deleterious
influence of stereotype threats related to age, sex, socioeconomic status, among other
social groups (sec Smith, 2004, for a review). With regard to paranormal or religious
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believers, it is possible that the process of stereotype threat impacted critical thinking
perfonnance if the participants were aware of negative stereotypes. A rating scale
examining paranormal or religious belief followed by a test of critical thinking could
potentially threaten participants if they believed that a stereotype of believers as
noncriti.cal thinkers existed.

Conclusion

Past research has indicated a possible relationship between religious belief and
critical thinking, but procedural problems and inadequate measurement have produced
inconclusive results. Cognitive psychology suggests a framework in which religious
schemata might be used experimentally to demonstrate whether the aetive presence of
religious belief eauses deficits in critical thinking skills. A multidimensional approach to
critical thinking and religious belief is suggested by past research. Measures of critical
thinking should include multiple skill areas, and measures of religious belief should take
into account the dynamic nature of religious orientation.
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CHAPTER Ill
METHODS

Participants

Participants were 55 undergraduate stndents enrolled in introdnctory psychology
classes at Utah State University. Participants represented 20 different college majors,
with the highest percentage reported in psychology (23.6%). Ages ranged from 18 to 51,
with a mean age of 21.86. Of the sample pool, 45.5% were female. Because the focus of
this study was on understanding the relationship between critical-thinking perfom1ance
and religious schema, questions about participants' religious beliefs and practices were
important for understanding the sample population. When examining religious
characteristics, the sample was rather homogenous. Nearly 75% of participants reported
an aniliation with The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), and the san1e
percentage of paiticipants reported attending some type of religious education in the past.
Sixty-five percent reported that they see themselves practicing their present religion for
the rest of their lives, and just over half the sample reported that they view their religious
beliefs as more correct than the beliefs of other religions. See Tables 2, 3, and 4 for
complete demographic information.

Materials

Two passages were developed for this study: a religious passage and a neutral
passage. In order to develop the religious passage, which was intended to elicit the
activation of a religious schema, several different articles and essays from various
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Table 2
Demographic Characteristics Frequencies

Neutral
passage group

Religious affiliation
None
LDS
Cathohc
Prot0stant

44.4
519

17

u

60.7
39.3

29

:~2.7

14

25

45.5

3
2l
I

lU
77.8
3,7

4

14.3

7

12.7

20

71.4
3.6
10 7

41
2

74.S

4

7.2

30

5,1._5

17

30.9

74.5
73

16
7

Yes
No

Total sampk
n

n

Variabk

Gender
Mak
Female

Rchgious
passage
group

l
3

2.5.9

l4
JO

77:~

20

7[A

41

3.7

3

1().7

4

593

3.6

Attend religious classes (past)
21
l

Yes

No

Table 3

Demographic ('.haracteristics .A1eans
Religious
passage

Neutral
passage group

--------••-'• -·-·-----·-·--

Variable

11

group

---- ------ · · · - - - - - -

%

n

Age

26

2l27

25

Y em·s of current religious courses

16

6.19

!4

Yearn o[past religious courses

20

75

18

%

(Ii

/1)

'.22A8
J.79
4.44

51

2. l.86

29

455

38

6.05

20

Table 4

R.e.,ponse Percentages.for Religious (,'ommjtmen.t Qucstiuns

Vari,;1ble

~cutral pnssagc

Rdi.gi.m1s
pas.i;agc

group

group

n

! consider myself' to be w1 ac:tive paiticipant

n
111

Total ,,,m1ple
H.

/H

my religious.
1-L~

18.5

Not true of me

Somi:what true of me

0

2

J.t'i

10 7

22.2

Trueofm.r
Very tnm of me

2

t6A

co 7

44.4

I Sl'C myself practicing my present religious l<Jr the resl of my hfc.
Not true of 1ne
Somewhat lrne

or me

True of nie
VL-ry tmc of me

2

7.,f

()

()

"";:~

2

4

7A
t,,Ul.

7. _!
'7. l

l5

55.6

21

··)

75

2
4

3(,

6

!O q

,J6

~

'

/',".I

65

j

I beHcvc that n1y rdigious beliefs am more corn::ct tlwn tlw bcliefti of otiwr n:li.gions.
Not irnc of me
Somewhat trne of me
Tnieofmc
Vcry true of rnc
- - - - _ . - - - • " O » < C O O - • - - • • o . c •..- -

2

7.4
!

0

3

I. 'I

5

i g.5
41-{J

3
J6

!3

14.5

:\0.7
5/J

"''•~•---•••-••~----•••••••Mn~•-~----~~•-ne<•••.,••-•--••••• - - - • " • ~ • - • • ' " ' ' ' ' • • - - - - " ' " " " • - - - • • • • •

g

(,1-,5

29

52.J

••~"'-uou,.,_,,,""' • - -.... a

periodicals and websites on a rnnge of topics salient to religious bt::!kfa were revie1,vt::d
These topics included the Eucharist, personal salvation, and conl.rov<:;t'E,.ial :iiubjects such

as stem-cell research, abortion, same-•se:,, marriage, and intelligent design. Each pclss-age
was weighed by the primary investigator and Bupervising faculty n1ember fbr it~ content
and the response it 1Nas likely to elicit. Passages de1::nied likdy to elicit an affective

response in participants were discarded 1n favor of passages det:·.mt:d likely to elicit a
cognitive response. Also., passagi;\S containing content specifo:.: to a particular
denomination

W\!re

discarded in favor of denomination--,ne11tral rnatcrial Based on these
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criteria, a passage on intelligent design was selected for use in this study (see Appendix
A). In order to develop the neutral passage sources were again drawn from periodicals.
Articles considered included factual information on such topics as climate change. the
United States economy, and the reproductive cycle of salmon. These passages were
reviewed and eliminated by the primary investigator and a supervising faculty member
based on the topic's potential relevance or connection to religious issues. T11e article on
salmon was chosen based on these criteria (see Appendix B ).
The Cornell Critical Thinking Test (CCTT), Level X (Ennis, Millman, & Tomko,
1985), a test used in previous research on critical thinking and paranormal belief was
used to evaluate critical thinking. This is a 52-itern test designed for 4th through 14th
graders, which included the target population, Tbe aspects of critical thinking measured
were: induction (judging whether facts support a hypothesis), deduction (deciding if a
conclusion follows from the premises), observation (attending to what is said, by whom it
is said, and under what circumstances), credibility (judging which statement is more
believable), and assumptions (identifying what is assumed in an argument). The test
produced a global critical-thinking score, as well as scores for the subscale skills. In this
test, respondents were presented with statements, and chose the appropriate response
from three choices, The test manual reported internal consistency estimates for Level X
of the CCTT as ranging from ,67 to .90, and convergent validity with the Wat~on Glaser
Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 1980) as ranging from r = .41 to .49 for a
sample of high school students (Ennis et al.). Frisby (1992) reported that individuals
with higher levels of education scored significantly higher on the CCTT than did
individuals with lower levels of education. The form of the CCTT used in this study was
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computerized, and required 45 minutes to complete, The scores on five skill areas (total
co1Tect, induction, deduction, credibility, and assumptions) were generated only in
percentage correct by the scoring software, and those were the seores used for analysis,
The measure of religious orientation for this study was the Age Universal
Religious Orientation Scale (Gorsuch & Venable, I 983), This scale includes two
separate subscales: extrinsic religious orientation (E), which is an orientation towards the
protective and social or group aspects ofrcligious practice; and intrinsic religious
orientation (I), which is an orientation toward a deeply held personal belief in a religion,
Nineteen of the 20 items are scored on a 5-point Liker! scale (1 ~, strong disagreement; 5

= strong agreement), while the remaining question regarding church attendance is scored
by attendance (I

= "a few times a year or less"; 5 = "more than once a week"),

Higher

scores on each of the subscales indicate a greater intrinsic and/or extrinsic religious
orientation, with a range in score of 9 to 45 for the intrinsic scale, and 11 to 55 for the
extrinsic scale, Internal consistency reliability coefficients for an adult sample of
Protestant Christians (N ,, l OI) were a

= .66 for the E subscale, and a= ,73 for the I

subscale, with an l to E correlation of r = -39, Alpha coefficients in a follow-up sample
of fifth- and seventh-grade students (N = 230) were ,75 and ,68 for the E and l subsca!es,
respectively, with an l to E coITelation ofr = --.28, The Age Universal Religious
Orientation Scale is a pencil-and-paper measure that required 20-30 minutes to complete,
Participants also completed a demographic questionnaire that gathered
information about their sex, age, college major, and reli1,rious affiliation, followed by a
series of questions on the participant's level of religious education and participation (see
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Appendix D). On a 4--point Likert acale, ("very true ofme," "true ofme," "somewhat
true of me," "not true of me") participants indicated whether they considered themselves
active in their religion, whether they saw themselves practicing their prcsei1t religion for
the rest of their lives, and whether they saw their religion as "more correct" than other
religions.
Procedures

A convenience sample of participants was recruited in person or by notice posted
to course websites, and volunteers were offered extra credit or course credit for
participation. Participants came in groups to a classroom computer lab on the campus of
Utah State University. When participants arrived they were given an informed consent
form. Following the provision of consent, the researcher then handed each participant
one of the reading passages. In handing out the reading passage, the researcher alternated
between the two passage conditions, so participants were randomly assigned a passage
based on the order of their arrival. Of the sample population, 28 received the Religious
Passage, and 27 received the Neutral Passage. Participants were then asked to answer
simple questions with written responses regarding the content of the passage to insure
that they had read the passage and to promote schema activation (see Appendix C),
Responses to the questions on the religious passage were checked qualitatively, as they
were the questions designed to elicit activation. Answers on the neutral passage were not
checked, as those questions were not designed to elicit activation. Two participants in
the sample did not answer the questions on the religious passage, so it is unknown
whether they read and understood the material. On the question of agreement with the
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message of the passage, 53.8% of participants did not agree with the passage content. On
the question of whether the passage wa, at odds with their religious beliefs, 80% of
participants indicated that it was. Answers to the questions on whether they agreed with
the passage suggested that participants read and understood the passage, so both
affirmative and negative answers could possibly indicate schema activation.
Participants then completed the computerized Cornell Critical Thinking Test-X
(CCTT-X). Following the completinn of the CCTT-X, participants completed the Age
Universal Religious Orientation Scale, followed by the demographic questionnaire. The
order of procedures was intended to mitigate the potential effocts of schema activation.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS

Preliminary Analyses

The participants in this study had a mean Total Correc:t score on the CCTT-X of
47.75 (SD, 8.38}, for 68. 13% correcl, with a Total Score range of21 to 63 This

matches closely with the scores from a normative sample of college freshmen reported by
the tesi manual (N - 6:14, mean Total Correct -· 46. 7, Sn-• 6.9). For this study, critical
thinking skill results were reported in percentage correct for Induction (J.1 = 65.3 l %),
Deduction (t,.f = 75.27%)., Credibility tA1 "" 5855~/o). and Assumptions (Ai'' 63 82%)
On the Age Universal Religious Orientation Scale, participants in this study had a
mean I score of -13. l l (SD= 9 66), with a range of l O to 44. On the E scale, participants
had a mean score of26.89 (SD·.- 5 66), with a range of l5 lo 38 (see Figure l). Overall,
this indicated that the sample for 1his study was on average more intrinsically oriented
than extrinsically oriented.

Research Question # l

To answer the first research question ([~ there a diflerence in critic.ii thinking

ability when religious schema are prirned'l) independent I tests wern conducted 1.0
evaluate the hypothesis that participants who had rdigious representations primed
through exposure to the religious passage would perform more poorly 011 the CCTT-X
than those without primed representations. Five t tests were condu"ted (see Table 5),
ea.ch with a different CCTT -X score ( tote.I correct, induction, deduction. credibility, and
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Table 5

CClT-}{ Scores by Religious Passage
Neutral passage
Skill area
Total correct
Induction
Deduction
Credibility
Assumptions

M
45.89
64.44
71.79
54.57
59.63

SD

8.29
16.20
]4.94
14.12
18.29

Religious passage
M
49.54
66.14
78.62
62.40
67.86

Cohe.n's

SD
8.21
19.76

1.64

12.91

.35
1.82

12.88
17.29

2.15
I.Tl

[J

d

.11
.73
.08
.04
.09

-.44
-.09
-.49
-.58
-.46

assumptions) as the dependent variable. The tests were only significant for the critical
thinking skill of Credibility, t(53) "'" 2.15, p "" .036. but the results were counter to the
research hypothesis. Those in the religious passage condition (M= 62.4, SD= 12.88)
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scort·d higher. indicating greater critical thinking skills in the area of' credibility than
those in the neutral passage (!vf = 54. 57. SI!

14. 12} with a medium moan difference

effect size of .58. The mean difference effect ~izes for four of the remaining critical
thinking skill areas were small. For induction, the mean d1fferenc:e eflect size was not
dinically rneaningt\1L In all cases participants in the religious passage condition scored
higher, indicating betlcr critical thinking skills, than participants in the neutral passage
condition. The direction of these relationships was nol anticipated

Research Questions #2

To answer the second research question (Do p1imed religious schema, intrinsic
religious orientation, or extrin~ic rdigious <1rientation predict critical thinking
performance')), linear regression analyses were conducted to evaluate whether primed
religious schema, intrinsic religious orientation, and extrinsic religiom, orientation predict
critkal thinking performance. Five regressions were conducted, each wilh a diflerent
CCTT-X ,core (total correct.. induction, deduction . credibility, and assumptiom,) as the
dependent variable (see Table 6). The linear combination of passage condition and
intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations was significantly related lo the skill areas of
Deduction Jnd Assump1ions. For Deduction, 26%, of the variance wa, accounted frlr, and
for Assumptions, '.!7~·;, of the variance was accounted for by these variables. For both of
these critical-thinking skills, the ex1rinsic religious orientation score proved to be the
only Matistically signil1cant individual predictor·, with high,rr levels of extrinsic religiou~
orientation predictive or poor critical thinking performance.
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Tabie 6

Linear Rer!,ressions
on the CCTT-}{
<,.
hidcpendcn.t variable and

R

R"

F

p

CCTT•-X total correct
Passage condition
Age-universal intrinsic
Agc-unvkrsal extrinsic.

.31.

.096

L80

.16

CCTT-X induction
Passage condition
Age-universal intrinsic
Age-universal cxtrim;:ic

.18

CCTl'--X deduction
Passage condition
Agc•-universal intlim,ic
Age-mwiersal cx.trinsi,~

.51

CCTT-X credibility
Pa.-;sage t:-0nditio11
Age-universal intrinsic
Age-unviersal extrinsic

.30

CCTT-X assu:mption
Passage condition
Age--univ<,"rsal intrinsic
Age-mi.vicrsal extrinsic

.52

.........-·-········-··

"J:rndictors

.(}31

55

fi

p

-.24

.09

-.03

8Y

-.22

.11

-.08

.57
.30

.65
-.15
-. !O

.26

.60

.001
-.24
-.17
-.41

.09

I.63

-.07
.04
6,18

J)6
.17
.001

..20
-,30

.27

.48

.04
.59

:n

.001.
-.23
.12

~.44

.06
.33
.001
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION

The purpose oflhis study was to gain a better understanding of the observed
relationship between critical thinking and religious belief Results from previous
research on whether a relationship exists between religious belief and critical thinking are
inconclusive (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Merla-Ramos, 1999; Morgan & Morgan,
1998; Roe, 1999), and it was posited that the priming of religious representations or
schema through procedural order effects could account for the discrepant findings in
previous studies. The present study attempted to control for such order effects by
comparing the critical thinking performance of those with active religious schema lo
those without active religious schema, and by exmnining how schema activation and
religious orientation contribute to critical thinking skills.

'Ibe results of this study support some of the previous findings on the relationship
between critical thinking and religions belief. Participants who endorsed higher levels of
religious orientation performed more poorly on a test of critical thinking than those with
lower levels of religious orientation. But these results did not support the research
hypotheses, in that the schema activation as represented by passage condition was not a
significant predictor of performance. Tn fact, those participants with primed religious
schema exhibited greater critical-thinking skills than those without primed religious
schema. In addition, higher levels of extrinsic religious orientation, but not passage
condition, were predictive of poorer performance on certain critical-thinking skills,
namely deductive reasoning and identification of assumptions in an argument. Also,
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results did not support the rdationship posited in the re~earch hypotheses between
religious schema, as represented by intrinsic religious 01ienta1ion, and cntical thinking
skills.
The results of this study do indicate the stere(>type threat may be an unlikely
explanation for previous findings on the relationship between critical thinking
performance and paranormal/rdigious belief Participants in this study were informed
that the procedures im·olved a test of critical thinking prior to part1cip.:1tion Likewise,
participants in the religious passage condition could have conceivably concluded that
their religious he!iefa wort' B factor

i11

the experiment prior i.o completing the CCTT-X.

If those participants 1~~1b religious beliefs folt threatened by any negative stereotypes
about the critical thinking abilities of religious bdievcrs, we would expect their
subsequent critical thinking perforn1anc1;, to be impairnd, not improved. But participants
ill the religious passage condition performed better than tho&e in the neu1ral passage

condition, indicating that stereotype threat could not be considered a causal agent in
poorer critical thinking performance
The relationship between cxtrin8ic religious orientation and critical thinking
ability might be attribu1able

10

the participants' individl!al approaches to 1he adoption of

belief If critkal thinking h ''reasonable., reflective. 1hinking that b focused on deciding
whs1 tn believe and do" (Norris & Enni,, 1989, p. l), then those with poorer critical
thinking skills might also be le~s inclined to examine their religious belicfa and pra,:tices.
Extrinsically oriented participan1s engage with rheir religion (or reasons of social
interaction and other prntectiv~ fac1ors. Such e·xternal motivations may he less connected
with internalized belief than wil b other factors, such as social norms and peer
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expectations. It therefore follows that participants who rated themselves as extrinsi,~ally
oriented might perform more poorly on c1iticaJ thi11king tasks because it was the poor
critical thinking abtlity that led to the extrinsic orientation in the first place. li is also
important to note that this relationship was not observed across all critical thinking areas
Extrinsic religious bdief was only related to poor performance on Deduction and
Assumptions. On the CCTT-X, these two areas of critical thinking nm highly related and
utilize similar reasoning skills. Ten ofthe test items that load on the Deduction score
also load 011 the Ass1.nnptions score, so comparahle performance between the two areas
was not unexpectc:d Of the areas tested by tht CCTT-X, Deduction is the most formal in
its basis on logic and reasoning.
In considering fi1ture research, thi~ study suggests several

11e11,

directions through

its findings, and also through its limitations. First, these results have less potential for
generalization due to the homogenous nature of the sample Nearly three quarteTS of
participants reported an aftiliation with the same religious group (LOS). Neither were
the participants heterogeneous in age. Additionally, all were college undergraduates at
the same university., indicating cornparahle levels of education and exposure

lO

critical

thinking instruction, ahhou![h this was not dirnctl} assessed. Additionally, this study did
not control for the patticipant s' level of university education, but since the sample ·was
recruited from general education psychology courses, it z:an be assumed lbat most
participants were early in their education.
Results from a longitudinal study condicted at UCLA by the Higher Education
Research Institute (HER I) suggested that theie is a difference between the way college
students rate their spirituality and religion~ participation m incoming freshmen, and later
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as juniors (HERT, 2004a). As freshmen, students reported much higher levels of
spirituality, and religious certainty and participation than they reported 3 years later. In
the foll report (HER!, 2004b), LDS respondents (members of The Chmch of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints), the major religious affiliation for this study' s sample, were found to
have "one of the most elear cut patterns of all the religions groups" (p. 18) on their
smvey responses. Specifically, LDS participants received the highest scores on the
factors of religious commitment, religious engagement, religious/social conservatism,
spirituality, and equanimity. They also received the lowest scores on religious
skepticism, a finding with implications for critical thinking. Given these findings, a more
heterogeneous sample drawn to include different ages and religious afliliations, with
consideration to level of education, would have greater generalizability.
As to the relationship between the passage condition and critical thinking
performance, the results were unexpected and counter to the hypothesis that the priming
of religious schema would predict poorer perfrxmance on critical thinking. It is possible
that the passage intended to activate religious schema instead elicited critical thinking.
The passage contained a message in favor of the principles of evolution and argued
against the teaching ofintelligent Design, a controversy with religious overtones.
Participants were therefore asked to comment on content they may have found at odds
with their personal beliefs. But rather than promoting belief persistence, the passage that
was selected for religious schema activation may have inadvertently caused the
participants to think critically about content they did not agree with. More specifically,
the questions participants answered about the religious passage may have been promoting
agent for critical evaluation and thought

}3
Future resear(h might address thi8 problem by sekcting religious mate1ial with
consideration of the degree to which participants will agree with i1s c:on1ent, and the
degree to which the prime engages other mental processes A more neutral task, such as
1he sentence scramble of religious and neutral words used by Randolf-Seng and Nielsen
(2007). might mitigate these effects. because the priming of &eherna need not he explicit

or even conscious to have an elfec1. The tvpe of stimulus presentation used in IA T is
specifically designed to access undt>rlying, cognitive a8sociations while avoiding the u~e
of explicit higher order processes Although [AT i,1 not 111:c.essarily intended to prime

schema, the stimulus presenta1io11 it employs would be a bet1er choice in foture research
on the effects of religious schema on critical thinking performance to avoid engaging
other explicit processes. Such primes could take the form of Randolf-Seng oi1d Nielsen·s
word scramble. Other opti,.)ns might include visual primes such as religious imagery and
s:,1nbnls, arranging for participants lo observe a religious authority (e.g. ckrgy or
missionaries), or administering the critical thinking test following a religion class
Another direction for foture investigation suggested by this ~tudy might be the
use of the Intrinsk/Exlrinsic-Revised (1/£.-R) scale developed by Gornuch and
McPher~on ( 1989) This revisio11 of the Age Universal 1-E Scale breaks the extrinsic
scale into orientation that i, personal (Ep) and ~oc1al (Es) However, the 1/E-R has fower
items than the Age Universal I-E Scale ( l4 compared to 20). and lower reliability
estimates for Ep, r '" .57, and Es, r = :i8. Given this low reliability. a better measure of
extrinsic orientation would be suggested for foture research. The Age Universal 1--E scale
was chosen for this study for its greater reliability, and for the fact that the research
suggested a potential relationship betv,een the Intrinsic ,'H:ale, which would be
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1heoretical!y rela1ed to religious schema, and criticH1 thinking. Given the present findings
on ex1rinsic orientation. ti:tture studies might utilize a scale better de,igned lo examine
extrinsic orientation as it relates tr, critical thinking performance
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l argue strongly against teaching ID in biology classes in state-supported schools.
If people wanl to do this in privately fonded religious schools, wdl, that is one

or the

cost, of democracy.

Why do l say this 9 Why should my heliefs---my evolutionary beliefs---b,: given
unique status in biology classes·/ First. because teaching an cssentiallv religious theory
like l D is illegal. ID 1s religion carefolly disguise.d as science to get around the
Constitution---tha1. is why lD ~upporttrs rarely talk explicitly ofGod---but it is religion
nevertheless. If the Supreme Court ruks othmvise, then that will nol be the fir5t time
that the Supreme Court has been wrong
More importantly, ID should

1101

be taught because it is not fruitful as science

Suying that the designer did something is what the philosopher Alvin Plantinga ha~
labeled 11 "science stopper." If you say that someone intervened. then you ar" stuck about
what to do next. Ttie succ-essfol scientist, including the scientist who spends all day
Sunday on his or her knees in church praying, is a methodnlogical atheist Science works

by assuming blind law and then going oul. to find it. Putting mailers bll!J1tly, today's
biologists argue that Darwinian evolutionary theory works; il is well tested:, and although
there are controversies (for instance, ov,;,:r the paleontological theory of punctuated
equilibrium promoted by the late Stephen Jay Gould)., the theory is accepted On the
other hand. ID theory adds nothing lo our siore of knowledge. li is promo1ed only
because people have religious beliefa they hold dear, and that is simply not the basis for
good science.
But what about the a1·gument that students should be allowed to decide for
themsell'<:s~ With all due n;spect to the president, that is nonsense. G<.>od education is

4,5

not a nmttcr ofindifferently otr;.;:ring to student:~ a range of options••"a kind of 1ntellectual
smorgasbord--and then letting them choose. Good education is teaching the best that you

have, together vvith the critical skiHs to take inquiry for1her-•-perhaps indeed oven urning
everything that we hold dear. ff I heard that my university's med students had to take
timr.:\ out from surgery or pharmacology in order to learn the principles of faith healing or

witch.doctoring, because some people believe in tbt~m, f would be appalkd--and so
would you.

So, I say: ID .is religion. It is Creationism Lite. Teach student::. about it 111

~:omparative. religion courses, along with Christian .ideas and th(~ ideas of other fl1iths. But
keep it out ofbio1ogy classes. It has no place in them.

Adapted frorn: Ruse, M. {n.d. ).
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Salmon i~ the common name fr1r several species offish of the Sahnonidae family.
Several other fishes in the family an: called trout. Salmon live in the Atlantic aud Pacific
Oceans, as well as the Great Lakes and other land-locked lah:s. The Kamchatka
Peninsula, in the Russian Far East, contains the world's greatest salmon sanctuary.
Salmon are anadromous: they are burn in fresh water, migrate to the ocean, then
return to fresh wator lo reproduce. Folklore has i11ha1 the fish return lo the exact spot
where th1:y were born to cipawu and modern resea.rch shows I hat usua.lly at least ()0% of
the fish spawni11g .in a stream were born there. [u Alaska, 1l1c crossing over io other
streams allows salmon to populate new streams, such as those tbat emerge as a glader
re!reats. How they navigate is still a mystery, though their keen sens,o of smell may be
involved. Young salmou migrate to the ocean where they v-11! develop in about two to
three yems, (dep,mding on the species) into mature salmon. After they develop, the adult
~almon will rn1um to its natiYe s1ream, breed, spawn and die. No one knows why they go
back to the stream rhey were born ill to die., but in order to complete their cycle they must
die. Before they die the females release the eggs and the males fertilize them.
Salmon is the third largest seafood product raised Oll fish farms, with shrimp
being the second and carps being by for the largest product. Raising salmon on filrms
decreases the demand for wild salmon Salmon are carnivorous and are currently fed a
meal produced from catching other wild fbh, so as tlie number of farmed salmon
increase, the demand for other lish to teed the salmon increaseR. \Vork continues on
substituting vegetable proteins fix animal proreius in the salmon diet. Most farms in
Alaska have a spe<:ial process for brnediug the salmon. The ,almo11 are born i11side a
stream in the la.rm and are brnd in special waters until they are old ~nough to become
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independent. Th(~Y are released into the ocean wern they are free to live and develop folly
until it is time for them to die. When they sense they are going to spawn they

immediately return to their stream l)f birth, in th.is case they return to I:he fanu ·where they
v,.:ere born. The farmers allow them t:o release some of their eggs and sorne of the other
eggs are stripped off to produce the eggs that are soJd around tbe v,1odd.
1

Adapted from: Fishery Management. (n.d.)
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Appendix C:

Passage Questions
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Religim1s Content Passage Qutstiom

What is your first reaction io this passage'/
2. Do you agree with the overall message contained in the passage9
3. If applicable, do your religious beliefs agree with the message contained in the

4. How are your religious beliefa similar to the message contained in the pass<1ge.
or how do your religious beliefs differ'.'

Ne11t1·11! C1:ml1m1 Passage Questions

I. In one or two sentenc,·s, describe the life cycl,~ of the salmon
2. Why might salmon migration be advantageous for salmon young'l
3 What, if any, might be the effects of salmon farming on wild salmon

populations'>

5!

D:
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QUESTIONNAIRE

Age.
Gender

M

Major:

Religious Affil1ation:

Do you currently attend religious education classes'? .... ______________
ff so, for hmv many years have you attended such -dasses? __________

Did you attend religious education dasse:-: in the past? _____
If so, fr)!· how many years did you attend such dasses? --------~
Are you a convert to your present rdigion? _ _ _ __

How recently? ----~ __ _____

I consider myself to be an active participant in rny religion.
(2) somewhat. trne of me
(3) true of me

(1) not true ofme

{4) very true of':1l1e

r see myself prnctici.ng my present reHgion fbr the rest of my life,
(!) not tn.ie ofme

(2) somewhat tme of n1e

(3) tme ofme

(4) very trne of me

[ believe that my religious beliefa are more correct than the be!iefa of other rdigions.
(!) not rrue of me
(2) sornewhat true ofme
(3) true ofme
(4) vl!ry true of me

